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Beyond Resilience: Welfare State Changes in Austria, Denmark, 
New Zealand and Switzerland 
ABSTRACT 
We examine whether a fundamental change in the core dimension of modern 20th 
century statehood, the welfare state, has become evident in response to changed 
exogenous and endogenous challenges. By combining quantitative and qualitative 
approaches we take stock of social policy development in four advanced welfare states - 
Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Switzerland - over the last 30 years. Neither 
spending patterns nor structural changes support the ‘race to the bottom thesis’, 
according to which the changed environment of welfare state policies has led to a 
downward spiral in benefit provision. On the contrary, we show that social spending 
levels have risen mainly due to a catch-up of former welfare state laggards. In structural 
terms a blurring of welfare regimes can be observed. This twofold process can be 
described as dual convergence. 
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Beyond Resilience: Welfare State Changes in Austria, Denmark, 
New Zealand and Switzerland 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The welfare state is intrinsic to statehood in contemporary advanced democracies. 
However, rising unemployment, increasing public debt, declining economic growth, an 
ever more competitive economic environment and changing demographics have 
increased the pressure on advanced welfare states over the last decades. How have 
welfare states responded to these changing conditions? What patterns of welfare state 
adaptation can we observe and what are their causes? Does politics still matter for social 
policy-making or is there a market-driven development towards a residual welfare state 
model? 
These are the key questions to be addressed in this paper. We examine the process of 
welfare state restructuring in four small open economies (Austria, Denmark, New 
Zealand and Switzerland) between 1975 and 2004 and compare the outputs of social 
policy reform over this period to clarify whether a changed international economy and 
various endogenous pressures have contributed to a transformation of the welfare state. 
By welfare state transformation we mean major policy changes in generosity and 
structures of benefit provision, funding principles and patterns of regulation. In 
addition, we discuss whether such policy changes reflect a more profound 
transformation of the state’s role in welfare provision characterised by shifts in the 
division of labour between state, market and family and/or shifts of competencies to 
lower levels of government or supranational institutions (see Zürn in this volume).  
A review of the comparative literature finds at least three seemingly contradictory 
explanations of how welfare states react to these challenges. These approaches also 
differ in their assumptions about the role politics can play in a markedly changed 
international political economy. 
A pessimistic line of reasoning (‘race to the bottom thesis’) expects declining social 
standards and a convergence towards a liberal model of social provision which is 
framed by a more general transformation of the state towards a competition state. 
Interestingly, this position is advanced by neo-liberal and Marxist scholars alike (Narr 
and Schubert 1994; Altvater and Mahnkopf 1999; Tanzi 2002). These scholars contend 
that governments have lost autonomy in fiscal and monetary policy-making in the 
course of globalisation and European integration and that globalisation has strengthened 
the power resources of capital through enhanced exit options. In consequence, the role 
of politics is increasingly subordinated to unleashed market forces, which are assumed 
to induce a downward spiral in benefit provision. 
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A second body of literature (‘resilience thesis’) argues that welfare states are 
embedded in a markedly changed international economy but have to cope with and react 
to distinct pressures rooted in different welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1999; 
Scharpf 2000) or varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). Though all nations are 
facing pressures to restructure social policy, Paul Pierson (2001) argues that the 
resilience of welfare states is the dominant mode of welfare state adaptation in times of 
austerity. Welfare state reform resembles more or less a rally around the flag because 
the exogenous and endogenous pressures to which mature welfare states are exposed 
have to be politically buffered. Since support for the welfare state is strong and welfare 
state clientele constitute a substantial share of the electorate, politicians who attempt to 
scale down the welfare state risk electoral punishment. Instead of radical transformation 
resulting from exogenous pressures, incremental adaptations of national welfare states 
are expected which depend on contextual parameters such as political and institutional 
configurations, policy legacies and the organisational power of beneficiaries (Kitschelt 
2001; Swank 2002). 
Finally, an optimistic view posits that the negative impact of globalisation on welfare 
states is strongly exaggerated (Garrett and Mitchell 2001: 145; Wilensky 2002: 247), 
arguing that the entire globalisation debate is much ado about nothing (‘business as 
usual thesis’). Some scholars even argue that integration of world markets and generous 
welfare states are complementary and mutually reinforcing (Rodrik 1997; Rieger and 
Leibfried 2001). Politics continues to enjoy substantial autonomy in shaping public 
policy, and leftist governments can still manipulate social policy according to their 
preferences (Garrett 1998; Boix 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001). In sum, this body of 
research concludes that the classic middle-range theories concerning the determinants of 
welfare state development (see Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Schmidt 2001) still have 
explanatory power. It is thus rather likely that the existing divergence of welfare 
regimes and the variety in social expenditure levels will persist even in times of 
austerity and global competition. 
The striking diversity of accounts found in the literature is puzzling. Partly it is 
ideologically motivated, but more important are different angles of analysis employed 
in terms of the dependent variable and the time span covered by the analysis. Studies 
focusing on spending levels regularly support the resilience thesis and persuasively 
reject the race to the bottom hypothesis (Castles 2004), whilst qualitative accounts point 
to more pronounced social policy changes (Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Clasen and 
van Oorschot 2002). 
By combining quantitative and qualitative approaches we take stock of recent social 
policy development in four advanced welfare states over the last 30 years and show that 
the controversy in the literature can be resolved to some extent. Since the impact of 
globalisation and endogenous challenges are likely to be mediated by national political 
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and institutional configurations, we argue that the patterns, direction and extent of 
welfare state transformation are decisively shaped by political institutions, political 
parties, policy legacies and specific problem pressures of welfare regimes. To examine 
the impact of politics on the process of welfare state restructuring, countries were 
selected that evince a substantial variety in their basic political and institutional features. 
We compare four small open economies – Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and 
Switzerland – which differ markedly in their number of institutional veto players and 
partisan complexion of government. If increased exit options for mobile factors threaten 
mature welfare states, then particularly small nations face strong pressures to redesign 
their welfare state arrangements. In addition, these countries are classified by Esping-
Andersen (1990) as liberal, social democratic and conservative welfare regimes.  
Since many retrenchment efforts only take effect in the long run and social policy 
changes typically occur in an incremental fashion as welfare states behave like 
‘elephants on the move’ (Hinrichs 2001; Hinrichs and Kangas 2003), we focus on long-
term developments in pension, unemployment, health and family policy over the last 30 
years. The next section examines the development of total social expenditure, 
programme-related spending patterns and funding principles over the period of 
investigation. The OECD Social Expenditure Database and the OECD Economic 
Outlook Database provide the necessary time series data. Section 3 analyses national 
trajectories of welfare state adaptation between 1975 and 2004 in four brief case studies. 
The final section compares the national adjustment paths and seeks to clarify whether 
the process of welfare state restructuring in the four countries examined ended up in a 
transformation of the (welfare) state. In addition, we briefly discuss the role of political 
variables in explaining policy change. 
2. THE MACRO-QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE: SOCIAL SPENDING 
DEVELOPMENT 
A view on social expenditure trajectories between 1980 and 1998 suggests that the 
welfare state is not on the retreat. Figure 1 illustrates that social expenditure levels have 
increased rather than declined in all countries over this period (for a comprehensive 
analysis see Castles 2004). In addition, welfare state effort, measured as the proportion 
of social spending to total public spending, has remained constant or even increased. 
Only in New Zealand did the relative weight of the welfare state decline.  
A similar picture emerges if real total expenditure per capita is calculated and total 
spending is broken down in its programme-related components. Real spending per 
dependent also reveals a continuous increase in expenditure levels. Figure 2 shows 
times series for real expenditure on old age cash benefits per person aged 65 and over, 
family cash benefits and family services per person aged 15 and younger as well as 
spending on active and passive labour market policy per unemployed. In addition, the 
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bold line exhibits the development of real total social expenditure per capita. Adjusting 
expenditure to programme-specific caseloads by and large confirms the general trend 
that spending either remained constant or even increased. This also holds for health 
expenditure per capita not reported in figure 2. Again, the only exception is New 
Zealand where spending on old age pensions has steadily declined over time.1 Spending 
efforts on unemployment compensation and activation measures per unemployed show 
a greater variation in all countries but these fluctuations are mainly driven by the 
business cycle. 
Figure 1: Social expenditure as a percentage of GDP (a) and of total public 
expenditure (b) 
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Although disaggregated spending trajectories show a more nuanced picture compared to 
the development of total social expenditure, we can conclude that the social spending 
profiles in the four nations under scrutiny are not indicative of a race to the bottom. All 
the indicators employed rather suggest a remarkable stability of spending efforts. 
A different question refers to the driving forces that have impacted the cross-national 
variation in spending. Ideally, this would require an econometric analysis. However, 
space limits prohibit such an endeavour but we briefly report some findings of a study 
by Kittel and Obinger (2003) who have employed the Social Expenditure Database to 
                                                 
1 However, this calculation of pension expenditure per person over 65 overstates the real value for New Zealand 
for most of the period because, between 1975 and 1992, retirement age was 60, and was then lifted to 65 over a 
period of nine years. 
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identify the factors driving social expenditure dynamics in 21 OECD countries between 
1980 and 1997. Empirical results derived from panel and cross-sectional analysis 
suggest that, first and foremost, social expenditure dynamics have been driven by catch-
up and by rising dependency ratios as reflected in rising unemployment and population 
ageing. Political variables contribute little to explain spending dynamics in OECD 
democracies. Specifically, only a weak and temporally unstable effect of political 
parties and institutional settings was found. With regard to the impact of globalisation, 
no robust negative impact of trade openness was detected, though the sign of the 
coefficient was consistently negative.2 
Figure 2: Programme-specific expenditure per dependent in national currencies at 
constant 1995 prices 
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2 These findings are largely consistent with those derived by Huber and Stephens (2001) and Castles (2004). 
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The finding of a catch-up effect suggests that convergence has taken place. As figure 3 
illustrates, this effect is fairly strong. Growth rates were highest in laggard countries and 
lowest in those nations which already maintained mature welfare states in 1980. The 
initial social spending level explains more than 50 per cent of the cross-national 
variation in social expenditure growth between 1980 and 1998. In addition, this chart 
illustrates that only Ireland and the Netherlands have reduced social spending over this 
period. Given this evidence, welfare states have converged towards a national steady 
state rather than to the bottom (Kittel and Obinger 2003; Castles 2004).  
In all four countries, public social spending makes up the bulk of total social 
expenditure, whereas mandatory private benefits contribute to no more than two per 
cent of GDP. Similar to spending, the broad patterns of welfare state funding remained 
largely unchanged. The welfare state in New Zealand and Denmark is still almost 
entirely tax-financed, while the share of social security contributions as a percentage of 
GDP has slightly increased in Austria and Switzerland since 1980.  
Figure 3: Social expenditure growth 1980-1998 
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Source: OECD 2002; Notes: Social expenditure growth is the difference between the natural logarithms of the social 
spending/GDP ratios in 1998 and 1980. The horizontal axis reflects the natural log of social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP in 1980. 
 
Nonetheless, the remarkable stability of spending and funding patterns does not rule out 
that major policy changes in regulation and benefit provision have occurred over the last 
30 years. To address this issue in more detail case studies are needed. The next section 
provides a scant summary about the adjustment paths in four small open economies. 
3. CASE STUDIES  
Austria 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, a duopoly of pro-welfare state parties, 
consensus democracy and corporatism, a consequent lack of institutional veto points to 
reform, together with favourable economic conditions from the 1950s onwards, 
constituted an environment highly conducive to welfare state expansion. New 
programmes were established and the existing social insurance benefits dating back to 
the 1880s and 1920s were not only steadily improved but also extended to new groups 
such as farmers and the self-employed. Judged by its structural make up, the Austrian 
welfare state is commonly classified as conservative (Esping-Andersen 1990). The 
forces underpinning this regime type are strong Christian democratic parties advocating 
Catholic social doctrines, such as the subsidiarity principle, the male breadwinner 
model, corporatist conflict resolution, and a legacy of paternalist policies mirrored in 
occupationally fragmented and mandatory social insurance. Status preservation via 
earnings-related transfer payments is central to this type. Entitlements are regularly tied 
to employment status, while benefits are earnings-related and contribution-funded. 
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Austria’s permissive constitution with the Constitutional Court as the only 
institutional veto player and the dominant role of political parties go a long way in 
explaining recent social policy developments. Welfare state retrenchment did not occur 
before the mid-1980s and was moderate but ever increasing in intensity during the 
period of the grand coalition governments formed by the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and 
the People’s Party (ÖVP) which governed from 1986 to 2000. The most substantial 
benefit cuts were imposed by the centre-right government that took office in 2000. The 
reform of old age pensions and unemployment insurance are the most prominent 
examples which illustrate the ever increasing intensity of retrenchment over time. 
The Austrian pension system is fragmented along occupational lines and provides 
benefits for old aged or disabled employees and their survivors. Benefits are funded by 
earmarked contributions and federal grants. The General Social Insurance Act (GSIA) 
of 1955 is the legal base of old age, health and accident insurance for blue and white-
collar workers. With the GSIA as a model, old age pensions were gradually extended to 
farmers, entrepreneurs, artists and professional groups such as lawyers and doctors. 
Civil servants are covered by a special and initially more generous scheme that is also 
financed through contributions and the public purse.  
The politics of labour shedding via early retirement regulations and invalidity 
pensions in a greying society exposed pension insurance to profound fiscal stress. In 
1998, almost 50 per cent of the social budget was devoted to old age pensions and 
survivors’ benefits, making the Austrian pension system one of the most expensive in 
the OECD. Moreover, the imperative of budget consolidation in the shadow of the 
Maastricht Treaty was an impetus to curtail the federal grants delivered to pension 
insurance.  
Increasing both contributions and the ceiling for contributory payments as well as 
changing the pension formula were repeated exercises to cope with demographic 
changes and fiscal austerity. The pension reform of 1987 (and that of 1993) extended 
the calculation base from 10 to 15 years. In addition, contribution-free credits in periods 
of tertiary education were abolished and eligibility to survivors’ pensions for childless 
survivors was tightened. Based on a Constitutional Court ruling in 1990, a uniform 
retirement age for men and women will be imposed until 2033. The pension reform 
launched in 1993 was more balanced: Benefit adjustment was changed from the 
dynamics of gross to that of net wages, while child raising periods were credited for 
benefit calculation up to a maximum of four years per child. The 1997 pension reform 
aimed at curtailing early retirement and increasing the effective retirement age, while 
eligibility to invalidity pensions was tightened. In addition, the calculation of pensions 
for civil servants was partly harmonised with that based on the GSIA. 
Retrenchment was further intensified by the centre-right coalition that came to power 
in 2000. In an effort to bring the actual age of retirement (which was on average 57.6 
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years in 1999) closer to the threshold of 65 years stipulated by law, early retirement 
pensions based upon invalidity were abolished and eligibility for early retirement was 
tightened by imposing benefit deductions. Survivors’ benefits were curtailed, whereas 
pension contributions for civil servants and pensioners were raised. A further reform 
followed in 2003. This draft was unprecedented in terms of the intensity of the benefit 
cuts suggested. The government proposed to calculate pensions on the basis of an 
employee’s full employment record instead of the best 15 years as under the previous 
system. This proposal was equivalent to a benefit cut of up to 30 per cent. In addition, 
the government increased its efforts to contain early retirement by cancelling early 
retirement pensions for employees with long contribution records and for the long-term 
unemployed. Given widespread opposition, the reform was slightly watered down but 
government used its parliamentary majority to pass the bill in June 2003. However, the 
government also imposed structural reforms that will take full effect in the long-run. A 
reform of severance payment in 2002 paved the way for a greater role of fully funded 
private and occupational pensions. Employers are now obliged to deduct 1.53 per cent 
of an employee’s monthly salary and to transfer this money to an individual account. 
The accumulated capital may be used in different ways, but converting capital into 
pension investment funds or occupational pension funds is the most attractive option, 
since no taxes are levied. In addition, civil servant pensions are to be fully harmonised 
with the regulations of the GSIA. However, the decision-making process on this issue is 
still in flux at present. 
The main route to cope with rising unemployment was to curtail benefits and to 
increase contributions. Until the mid-1990s, the latter strategy clearly dominated as 
contribution rates have been raised from 2.10 per cent in 1980 to 6.00 per cent in 1994. 
Unemployment insurance reforms combined selective improvements with modest 
benefit cuts until 1993 (Talos and Wörister 1998). The replacement rate of 
unemployment assistance, a means tested benefit for the long-term unemployed, was 
slightly reduced but, following a ruling of the Constitutional Court, unemployment 
assistance was extended to foreigners. Employment services were decentralised and 
spun-off from the direct public administration (Hoheitsverwaltung). The mid-1990s 
witnessed a shift of emphasis in labour market policy. While contribution rates were 
stabilised at six per cent, the government increasingly relied on benefit cutbacks. 
Reform of unemployment compensation was characterised by modest cuts in the net 
replacement rate and stronger sanctions in case of unwillingness to work. There was 
also a shift towards active labour market policy. Special unemployment allowance for 
elderly unemployed with long insurance record - a benefit to bridge the time gap until 
retirement - was abolished in the course of the austerity packages in the mid-1990s. The 
centre-right coalition reduced family supplements for the unemployed by around a third 
(with the partner’s income no longer taken into account) and imposed a uniform net 
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replacement rate of 55 per cent. In addition, the federal grant to unemployment 
insurance was cancelled. 
Cost explosion was a major theme underpinning the reform of health insurance. In 
contrast to unemployment and pension insurance, this social insurance branch was not 
subject to fundamental reform. Similar to pension insurance, health insurance is 
occupationally fragmented and contribution-funded. However, with a coverage of 99 
per cent of the resident population it is de facto a universal system. Hospitals are 
financed through general revenue and health insurance. The main route to cope with 
increased health expenditure was to extend co-payments beyond farmers, civil servants 
and the self-employed. In 1988, the government imposed co-payments to cover the so-
called hotel costs in case of hospital treatment. As of 1997 patients have to pay a 
contribution amounting to EUR 3.60 on each health insurance voucher, whereas co-
payments for cures were imposed in 1996. The centre-right coalition continued and 
intensified this policy. User charges for hospital treatment and prescription charges were 
raised and a new user charge for out-patient treatments in hospitals was established. In 
addition, free health co-insurance for childless couples was abolished (with the 
exceptions of recipients of care allowance and carers of disabled relatives).  
A further attempt to curb expenditure was to reorganise hospital funding. Hospital 
funding is characterised by a considerable fragmentation between the federal 
government and the nine Länder which was seen as contributing to inefficient 
investment, duplication of effort and over-capacities. In 1997, the federal government 
and the Länder agreed on a state treaty to reduce the cost explosion in the health sector 
through improved co-ordination in hospital planning and financing. According to this 
agreement, each province had to establish a hospital fund financed by the federal 
government, the Länder, the municipalities and social insurance. The federal 
government guarantees the Länder additional funds if they agree to the Austria-wide 
hospital and capital investment plan. 
There were, however, areas in which benefits were increased or extended. These 
involved the coverage of psychotherapeutic treatments by health insurance or the 
equalisation of sickness cash benefits between blue-collar and white-collar workers. A 
major breakthrough was the introduction of federal care allowance for the permanent 
disabled people in 1993. This new programme is entirely tax funded and anchored a 
structurally unique pillar into the Austrian social security system. The Länder agreed to 
enhance the provision of social welfare services and to subsidiary care allowances based 
on the same objectives and principles as the federal legislation for people not classified 
as in need of care under federal law. Finally, in 1998, compulsory health (and pension) 
insurance was extended to the so-called new self-employed (Scheinselbständige).  
Income support to families is generous compared with other OECD countries. Most 
cash benefits are funded by the Compensation Fund of Family Expenses which is fed by 
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employers’ contributions and payments by the federal government and the Länder. 
These funds are used, for example, for family allowances and free school books. Cash 
benefits such as family allowances are universal. Retrenchment in this field occurred 
with two austerity packages launched in the mid-1990s which abolished birth 
allowances and imposed co-payments for school books.  
Recent years have witnessed several efforts to overcome the shortcomings with 
regard to day-care facilities for children. In the late 1990s, the grand coalition provided 
special grants to sub-ordinate governments to enhance the number of child care facilities 
which are the responsibility of the Länder and municipalities. Despite a declining 
number of children, the number of day-care facilities has increased since the 1980s. 
However, there is still a substantial mismatch in coverage between rural areas and urban 
agglomerations (Statistik Austria 2002). 
Parental allowance was subject to numerous reforms. Initially, this was an insurance-
based lump-sum benefit for mothers paid for 12 months subsequent to maternity 
allowance that replaced the full salary for eight weeks after birth. The grand coalition 
extended parental allowance from one to two years in 1991 but reduced it from 24 to 18 
months in the mid-1990s. The centre-right government finally replaced this benefit by 
the universal child care benefit which is granted for a period of up to three years as a 
non-employment-related lump-sum transfer provided that both parents take care of the 
children.  
 
In sum, the majority of changes, at least over the last two decades, has been about 
cutting benefits, reducing entitlements and increasing contributions, though there were 
also selective benefit enhancements (e.g. care allowances) and an increase in coverage. 
Overall, the contribution-benefit nexus and the pressure for labour market participation 
(activation) have been intensified. Unger and Heitzmann (2003: 384) therefore argue 
that the Austrian welfare state returned to its conservative roots. Although there is no 
doubt that the insurance principle was strengthened recently, this judgement ignores 
crucial developments which rather suggest that the Austrian welfare state is less 
conservative today. Two salient features typical for conservative welfare states are on 
the retreat, though these developments will take full effect only for the younger cohorts. 
First, the profession-specific differences between blue-collar and white-collar workers 
have been levelled-out over time and occupationally fragmented pension systems are to 
be harmonised in the long-run. Secondly, and more importantly, the principle of status-
preservation has been hollowed out. This not only holds true for unemployment 
compensation, which guarantees comparatively low replacement rates, but also for old 
age pensions in the wake of the 2003 pension reform. Moreover, care allowances for the 
disabled have increased service-orientation and child care facilities were enhanced over 
recent years. Finally, the new child benefit marks a break with the employment-centred 
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design of the welfare state, because its approach is universal and no longer linked to an 
earlier employment record.  
The Austrian experience also suggests that parties do matter in more subtle ways in 
times of austerity. The social democrats are by no means pure defenders of the welfare 
state. Together with their Christian democratic coalition partner they launched two 
austerity packages in the mid-1990s which imposed substantial cuts in social and public 
sector spending. But compared with the centre-right coalition that took office in 2000, 
retrenchment was moderate since the grand coalition governments in Austria were 
characterised by a greater ideological distance between the incumbent parties than was 
the case for the succeeding centre-right coalition. Operating under a permissive 
constitutional setting and by deliberately bypassing the traditional system of social 
partnership, the latter therefore was able to implement more far-reaching policy 
changes.  
Denmark 
In the last decade this small country in the North of Europe has gained much attention 
as role model for successful welfare state restructuring. Well known as a social 
democratic welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990), Denmark has offered universal and 
generous benefits promoting equality and diminishing stigmatisation. Welfare state 
provision is almost entirely tax-financed and public services play an important role. 
Today, Denmark continues to be one of the most developed and most comprehensive 
welfare states in the OECD with social expenditure at approximately 30 per cent of 
GDP.  
The Danish parliament is unicameral. Broad coalition cabinets and minority 
governments are characteristic. Administrative powers are distributed on state, regional 
and local levels. Traditionally, the local provision of welfare is important in the 
structure of the Danish welfare state. Nonetheless, the question of more or less 
decentralisation is a recurrent topic in welfare state reforms. 
With the election of 1973 – the so-called ‘landslide election’ – the typical Nordic 
five-party system broke up and five new parties moved into parliament.3 The following 
two decades are described as a period of political instability (Nielsen 1999): From 1973 
to 1993 nine elections took place and eleven governments held office. The social 
democratic hegemony was broken and from 1982 to 1993 a coalition of Conservatives, 
Liberals and Christian Democrats controlled cabinet. At the beginning of their term in 
office “[…] the level of voluntary early retirement, unemployment and sickness 
                                                 
3 Traditionally the five-party system consisted of a social-democratic party and a socialist/communist party on the 
one side and the Liberal party, a Farmer’s party and a centrist or Conservative party on the other. After the 1973 
election further five parties moved in to parliament: the Communist party, the Christian party, the Progressive 
party, the centrist democrats and the ‘justice’ party. 
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benefits, was more or less frozen for three years” (Green-Pedersen 1999: 247). Due to 
high inflation and rising wages this meant a de facto severe cut back (see figure 1). 
Nevertheless, the principle of universalism, generosity and the state’s role in welfare 
provision remained unchanged. Rather, “[…] the Danish welfare state was further 
expanded in a social democratic direction” (Green-Pedersen 1999: 243) during their 
reign.  
In the 1990s, fiscal pressure and high unemployment led to a welfare state crisis. The 
newly elected social democratic government reacted with several reform packages and 
successfully reduced public debt as well as unemployment. In their 2001 election 
campaign, both the liberals and the conservatives refrained from their former neo-liberal 
rhetoric and promised improvements in maternity and paternity leave as well as in 
hospital funding. With this centrist turn on welfare state policies and ‘anti-immigration’ 
demands the liberal-conservative coalition succeeded. For the first time since 1924 the 
Social Democrats were not the biggest parliamentary group.  
The Danish pension system was subject to a number of changes concerning benefit 
rates and the organisational structure. At first glance, theses changes seem only minor, 
producing differences in degree, not in kind (Kvist 1999). However, in a long-term 
perspective these changes can be regarded as path breaking (Goul Andersen/Albrekt 
Larsen 2002). The ‘Folkepension’, a universal flat-rate pension scheme at age 674, was 
introduced in 1956. This basic pension scheme still exists today, but step-by-step the 
labour market related tier of the Danish old age pensions system was further expanded. 
Already in 1964, ‘supplementary mandatory pension insurance’ was introduced (ATP5). 
The umbrella organisation of the Danish trade unions (LO) called for further 
occupational pensions and in 1993 almost all professions represented by the LO were 
covered by supplementary pension schemes which were financed by employers and by 
employees. Two further schemes were established: in 1980 ‘Lønmodtagernes 
Dyrtidsfond’6 and a ‘temporary pension savings scheme’ (SP7) in 1998. Whereas the 
former has never played an important role, the latter has been subject to recent reforms 
and party conflict. In 1999, the social democratic government changed the scheme from 
an earnings-related to a flat-rate pension saving, but in 2002 the newly elected 
bourgeois government reversed this, stopping the redistributive effect. Today, the 
Danish pension system consists of three pillars: a public tax-financed ‘Folkepension’, 
                                                 
4 The retirement age was lowered to 65 in 1999 in order to decrease the number of people on early retirement. The 
aim was to reduce costs because old age pension benefits are lower than early retirement benefits. 
5 The ‘Arbejdsmarkeds Tillægspension’ (ATP), a flat rate benefit, was limited to employees. 
6 The ‘Lønmodtagernes Dyrtidsfond’ is phasing out. It is the administration of the cost-of-living adjustment from 
1977-79 and will be wound up when in about 30 years the accumulated assets will be paid out. 
7 The ‘Særlige Pensionsopsparing’ (SP) was introduced in order to prevent the economy from over-heating. It is a 
compulsory saving scheme. 
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several contribution-based occupational schemes and privately organised individual 
insurance schemes. Consequently, the universal, tax-financed pillar has lost importance 
and Danish old age pensions have become more dependent on previous labour market 
participation.  
In contrast, the health care system has not seen a major restructuring in the period 
under investigation (European Observatory on Health Care Systems 2002: 1). Two 
important changes were already imposed in the early 1970s: Counties and 
municipalities were made responsible for the health care system and a universal Health 
Care Reimbursement Scheme replaced the health insurance system. Every Danish 
inhabitant is entitled to services. General practitioners act as gatekeepers to specialists 
or hospital treatment. The system is tax-financed with only minor co-payments for 
medicine and for some forms of special treatment. Pharmaceutical co-payments have 
risen recently, primarily as a cost-control measure. In March 2001, the social 
democratic government introduced new rules for co-payments. According to the new 
system the size of reimbursement depends on the individual’s personal consumption per 
year. People using a lot of drugs and people in need of long-term medication receive 
more compensation than the rest. Since the 1980s the total sum spent on health care has 
risen whereas health care expenditure measured as percentage of GDP dropped from 
9.10 per cent in 1980 to 8.30 per cent in 2000. Although no overhaul of the health care 
system has taken place, a number of regional initiatives altered the way in which health 
care is delivered. There is a tendency to increase efficiency, reduce waiting periods for 
hospital beds, and improve quality and patient rights.  
Labour market policy in Denmark, especially measures for the unemployed, recently 
received much attention, because the social democratic government during the 1990s 
was successful in implementing new and innovative labour market policies 
(Egger/Sengenberger 2003). The Danish ‘miracle’ (Schwartz 2001) gained prominence 
as a counter strategy to neo-liberal cut back-rhetoric even though some researchers 
criticise the reforms’ outcomes (van Oorschot/Abrahamson 2003). Denmark offers on 
the one hand a flexible labour market with only diminutive regulations and on the other 
hand high social security. This ‘flexicurity’ (Braun 2003) is accompanied by a still 
voluntary unemployment insurance, which is organised by 35 state-recognised 
unemployment insurance funds and administered by the unions.  
Up until the 1980s, labour market policies aimed at reducing labour supply, for 
example through government-financed early retirement schemes. These programmes 
still continue to exist but there has been an important shift during the 1990s to 
reintegrate the unemployed in the labour market. Activation has been the guiding 
principle of the 1990s reforms for the insured as well as for the uninsured. The 
following descriptions concentrate on measures for the insured unemployed. Along with 
the reforms of 1994 came a number of new instruments which followed the principle of 
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entitlement and obligation. The individual recipient has the obligation to participate in 
training schemes and other measures. And he has the right to choose his ‘individual 
action plan’. Two issues already on the agenda in the reform era during the 1960s were 
further pushed forward: decentralisation and bringing administration and recipients 
closer together. Measures such as closer local cooperation between employers, 
unemployed and the local employment service should reduce unemployment caused by 
a labour market mismatch. In order to increase flexibility, the possibility to move 
between periods of employment, unemployment and periods spent on caring for 
children or on further training was improved. At the beginning, three leave schemes 
were introduced: one for childcare, one for further training and one for sabbaticals. The 
latter two were stopped as soon as the demand for manpower grew in the late 1990s. 
The first was replaced by new parental leave legislation in 2002 (see below). Duration 
of unemployment benefit receipt was shortened in the reform era from up to ten years in 
1994 to four years in 1999. As outlined in their 2003 action plan “More people in 
Work”, the liberal-conservative government introduced measures to harmonise and 
simplify the rules governing municipal action to improve the re-integration of the 
unemployed into the labour market. With the same argumentation they made social 
assistance the responsibility of the Ministry of Employment, emphasising the obligation 
to work. Shortening of benefit duration, rising obligations and work requirements for 
benefit receipt is the overall trend in labour market policy in the period between 1975 
and 2004. However, benefits are still generous in a comparative perspective. State 
regulation rather increased than diminished although welfare provision was further 
decentralised.  
The Danish welfare state has traditionally been characterised as women and family-
friendly (Hernes 1987), providing day-care services for children in order to integrate 
women into the labour market. Women’s participation in the labour market as well as 
the proportion of children in public day-care is traditionally high compared to other 
European countries. Traditionally municipalities have the main role in financing and 
providing social services. Therefore, the funding of day-care for children lies with the 
municipalities. So does the administration of the child benefit, which is granted to all 
families with children under the age of 18. Supplementary cash benefits exist for 
families in special need. Apart from a short period from 1977 to 19868, the child benefit 
has always been universal and flat rate since its introduction in 1952. In contrast to the 
general policy of cut backs, family allowance was increased during the 1990s (Kvist 
1999). Since women’s labour market participation is very high, maternity leave and 
                                                 
8 In order to reduce spending on family allowance the Social Democrats introduced a means test whereas the 
opposition planned a universal cut back of benefits by ten per cent. In 1986, the centre-right majority in 
parliament re-introduced universal child allowance (Green-Pedersen 2003). 
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maternity allowance play an important role. Parental leave has been gradually 
prolonged. In 1984, the 14 weeks of maternity leave were extended by another 10 weeks 
that now either mother or father can take. Leave provision was further increased in 
1992. In 1999, two extra weeks became available exclusively for men. Another 
extension in 2002 is now giving both parents together the possibility of up to 52 weeks 
of paid absence. In accordance with a conservative family ideology, the liberal-
conservative government introduced in 2002 the possibility to be granted an allowance 
if parents choose to opt out of public day-care. These measures were introduced as both 
a family and a labour market policy instrument in order to reduce labour supply and to 
cope with the shortage in day-care facilities. Despite a comparatively high labour 
market participation of women, the reform of 2002 has been criticised for not promoting 
gender equity.  
In general, only minor cut backs in benefits were carried out and Denmark continues 
to be a comprehensive welfare state. Yet, the welfare state has lost some of its salient 
regime characteristics. Elements from the liberal welfare state (‘workfare’) were 
adopted as well as from the conservative regime type (linkage to previous employment 
in old age pensions, expansion of cash benefits and leave schemes in family policy). In 
other respects Denmark sticks to the social democratic path. Unemployment insurance 
has kept its universal and generous character because coverage and replacement rates 
have remained high although eligibility rules were tightened. The child benefit and the 
basic old age pension (‘Folkepension’) have remained universal and flat-rate. There is 
neither a clear shift of competencies to lower levels of governments nor to supranational 
institutions. The state preserved its dominant role in the provision and funding of 
welfare programmes. Although the number of institutional veto players is low, 
fundamental policy change did not occur because of a broad welfare state consensus 
among the governing parties. In addition, minority governments made political 
compromises necessary and hindered more radical reforms changing the overall 
character of the Danish welfare state.  
New Zealand 
New Zealand’s welfare state has undergone significant change in all of its constituent 
programmes since 1975. Regarding the welfare state’s structural features, the country 
has been grouped among the ‘liberal welfare regimes’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). Many 
of the main programmes were designed according to ‘liberal’ principles, notably means 
testing. Yet, health care provision, family income transfers and part of the public 
pension were universal in 1975. Social insurance features have never been strongly 
promoted in New Zealand, and only one programme – accident compensation – is partly 
earnings-related and based on insurance principles. In terms of social expenditure, New 
Zealand has had below-average growth rates during the post-war period. Looking 
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exclusively at direct provision of transfers and services by the state, however, might not 
be sufficient. It turned out that, for much of the post-war era, a high degree of ‘social 
security’ in a wider sense was achieved in New Zealand – and even more so in Australia 
– through a combination of various policy instruments and favourable economic 
conditions without relying much on direct social expenditure. On the one hand, both 
countries had lower demand for social security, by virtue of a high degree of economic 
development, male full employment, a rather ‘young’ demographic profile and high 
home ownership rates. On the supply side, on the other hand, trade protectionism and a 
highly regulated system of wage setting led to high wages – set at a level sufficient to 
support a wife and family – and to an egalitarian income structure. Consequently, 
Francis Castles called the Australasian welfare regime the “wage earners’ welfare state” 
(1985).  
In the 1970s, this system of production and protection came under heavy strain, 
mainly due to shifts in the world economy (Schwartz 2000) and various social changes 
such as rising female labour participation and family change (Castles 1996). The Labour 
government of the 1980s (1984-1990) famously responded to the economic problems by 
what might be the most rapid and radical economic reforms an OECD-country has seen 
in recent years, thereby accelerating the demise of the ‘wage earners’ welfare state’. 
Labour’s conservative successors continued the liberalisation and dismantled the system 
of wage regulation. Reform-minded governments were helped by the extremely 
permissive institutional environment of New Zealand’s Westminster-style political 
system, where, prior to the constitutional changes of the 1990s, the Prime Minister and 
cabinet were usually supported by a single-party majority in parliament and unhindered 
by institutional veto points such as a second chamber, federalism or a constitutional 
court. This gave reformers the opportunity to push through legislative changes at a 
remarkable speed and virtually unhindered by political opponents. In 1993, however, 
the country changed its electoral system from a single-member plurality system (‘first 
past the post’) to proportional representation. The new system makes single-party 
majority governments less likely, and recent experience in New Zealand is a case in 
point. None of the governments since 1993 has been able to rely on a single-party 
majority in parliament. For most of this period, minority governments have been in 
office and coalition governments have been the rule. Arguably, institutional change has 
made radical short-term policy reversals much more difficult as governments now 
depend on other parties’ support.9 
Today, after the economic reforms, New Zealand no longer has a comprehensive 
system of ‘social protection by other means’ (Castles 1996). Yet, there is still a ‘core’ 
                                                 
9 See Boston et al. (1996: chapter 9) for a first exploration on the new dynamics of policy-making under 
proportional representation. 
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welfare state, i.e. direct cash transfer programmes and social services. In the following, 
the focus will be above all on changes in this field. 
The mid-1970s saw a massive expansion of public involvement in the field of 
pensions when the conservatives introduced National Superannuation, a generous 
universal flat-rate pension at age 60. Today, almost 30 years later, New Zealand’s 
pension system is still universal in principle, albeit at a markedly lower benefit level 
relative to average wages and with a qualifying age of 65 years. However, it would be 
wrong to conclude that pension reform in New Zealand was a path-dependent, 
incremental adjustment process towards a somewhat less generous scheme within a 
stable institutional framework. Superannuation has in fact been the “supreme political 
football” (Weaver 2002), subject to almost constant short-term reforms by left and 
right-wing governments alike. Labour, for instance, introduced a highly unpopular 
‘claw back’ tax for better-off pensioners – the ‘Superannuation surcharge’ – in 1986 in 
an attempt to curb the burgeoning cost of Superannuation. This policy was abandoned 
in 1998 by a conservative-led coalition. Since 1975, the pension scheme has seen 
numerous changes of the benefit adjustment mechanism and a rapid increase in the 
eligibility age from 60 to 65 years between 1992 and 2001 (St. John 1999). Financing 
the old age pension has been on the agenda throughout the 1990s. The centre-left 
coalition eventually established a Superannuation Fund in 2001 that aimed at pre-
funding part of the future pension expenditure for the baby-boom birth cohorts but 
without affecting individual pension entitlement.10 Today, universal Superannuation is 
still the central instrument of public pension policy. There is still no ‘second tier’ 
earnings-related scheme and private provision remains completely voluntary and is not 
subject to special tax incentives (St. John 2001). 
New Zealand’s public health sector has been considerably restructured in the 1990s. 
Established in 1938 along universal lines11, the system has remained intact in terms of 
the overall principles of entitlement but the instruments of service provision have been 
changed. In 1993, the conservative government introduced a ‘purchaser-provider split’ 
hoping to increase the system’s efficiency. Four Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) 
were to act as the main purchasing organisations, each with a single budget to buy 
primary and secondary health services and disability support on behalf of the population 
– three areas until then separately financed. In terms of provision, the change was just as 
radical: The government regrouped public hospitals and community services into 23 
profit-oriented Crown Health Enterprises and made them to compete with private 
                                                 
10 A proposal to replace Superannuation with a compulsory savings scheme based on individual accounts was 
rejected in 1997 in a binding referendum by an impressive margin of 91.8 per cent (Weaver 2002). 
11 From 1938, the government has never been able to fully integrate general practitioners’ services into the scheme 
but they are partly subsidised. In reality, primary care has always been a state-regulated but nonetheless 
predominantly private affair (Crampton 2001). 
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hospitals, general practitioners (GPs) and voluntary organisations in an internal market 
for contracts with the RHAs (Ashton 1999). It turned out that the new system, if 
anything, did not increase the efficiency of public health care provision. As a 
consequence, the right-wing coalition watered down the quasi-market structure as early 
as in 1997 (Ashton 1999). More importantly, in 2001, the Labour-led government 
established 21 District Health Boards responsible for both funding and provision of 
services in their districts, thus abandoning the purchaser-provider split of 1993. To a 
certain extent, the private sector is still involved in delivery of public services but the 
reach of the controversial ‘market model’ is now significantly limited (Health Reforms 
2001, Research Team 2003). On the level of individual entitlement rules, change has 
been much scarcer. Hospital care is still universal.12 At the same time, state subsidies for 
primary care – which have always covered only part of the usual GP charges – were 
targeted to low-income groups and the chronically ill. Co-payments for medicine 
consist of a general prescription charge and, for some drugs, a co-payment, depending 
on the extent to which certain drugs are subsidised. Since 1997, children under six get 
GP visits and pharmaceuticals free of charge (Crampton 2001).  
Means testing has always been a strong principle in New Zealand’s social welfare 
history. The major needs-based benefits such as unemployment benefit, sickness benefit 
or Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB), which is mainly claimed by lone mothers, have 
undergone significant changes since 1975.13 The single most important event was the 
incoming conservative government’s 1991 budget, with extensive cuts between five and 
27 per cent across a range of benefits (St. John and Rankin 2002: 5). The government 
tightened eligibility criteria, particularly for young and unemployed people. 
Furthermore, instead of automatic adjustments in line with inflation, benefits are now 
adjusted annually on a discretionary basis (St. John and Rankin 2002: 13). In addition to 
lower benefit levels, there has been a marked tendency towards ‘activation’ and 
‘workfare’ policies (Higgins 1999). The subsidised employment schemes of the 1970s 
and early 1980s were scrapped in 1985 on grounds of possible market distorting effects 
and replaced by a training scheme in 1987 (Higgings 1999: 262-263). Governments of 
the 1990s – coming from both ends of the political spectrum – put more emphasis on 
individual obligations in order to end so-called ‘welfare dependency’. Work testing was 
introduced by conservative governments for most working-age beneficiaries – not just 
those on unemployment benefits but also many lone mothers and spouses of 
                                                 
12 Co-payments for public hospital services were introduced in 1992 but had to be stopped after only 13 months 
following strong criticism and implementation difficulties (Ashton 1999). 
13 In housing policy, the early 1990s mark a major turning point, as well. The government withdrew from direct 
provision of state rentals with reduced rents for low-income households and, instead, tried to intervene solely 
through income support, with the new Accommodation Supplement. This reform was partially reversed in 2000 
(Murphy 2003). 
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unemployment beneficiaries. Recipients were expected to take up paid work or 
participate in community works or training schemes and sanctions for non-compliance 
were tightened. In 2000, the Labour-led coalition reduced some of the work obligations 
for the sick and for lone mothers but kept the overall strategy. Furthermore, the 
government is increasingly trying to move beneficiaries into work through intensive 
case-management combining tight monitoring and a wider range of employment and 
training opportunities. 
Apart from the ‘family wage’, one of the pillars of the ‘wage earners’ welfare state’, 
post-war income assistance for families in New Zealand was based on the universal 
Family Benefit. However, governments failed to regularly adjust benefit rates to rising 
price levels, thus allowing its real value to decline markedly since its introduction 
(Shirley et al. 1997: 255). The last adjustment before the abolition of the Family Benefit 
came in 1979. Instead of universal payments, New Zealand governments from the mid-
1970s onwards increasingly relied on means tested assistance. First, this was done in 
form of tax rebates for low-income families, until the introduction of Family Support, a 
major means tested programme under Labour in 1986. The subsequent National 
government ended universal assistance altogether in 1991. Beginning in 1986 with the 
Guaranteed Minimum Family Income, a negative income tax scheme for the working 
poor, family policy in New Zealand became increasingly dual in character, in the sense 
that working families can claim additional in-work-benefits whereas families with both 
parents out of work have to rely exclusively on basic financial assistance. Today, there 
is the Family Support programme for all low-income families and a number of 
additional tax credits for working families only (Nolan 2002). Income transfers are 
accompanied by social services, notably child-care services which have seen a 
significant expansion since the 1970s (Shirley et al. 1997: 271) and for which low-
income families can claim government subsidies (St. John and Rankin 2002). Unpaid 
parental leave was introduced in New Zealand in the 1980s and only in 2002 did the 
government finally set up a comprehensive paid parental leave scheme which was 
enhanced further in 2004 to bring the country in line with current ILO standards (The 
Jobs Letter 2004). In May 2004, the Labour government announced a huge spending 
boost for family cash transfers and services, without abolishing means tests. Arguably, 
this is the most significant welfare state expansion of the last 25 years. 
The overall picture of welfare state change in New Zealand is one of significant 
transformation, with the first government of conservative Prime Minister Bolger (1990-
1993) as the major policy turning point of the 1975-2004 period. This is when the 
deepest benefit cuts and entitlement changes took place and when the health care sector 
was radically restructured. The impact of this shift is also reflected in the slump in 
social expenditure at the beginning of the 1990s (see figure 1). Although aggregate 
social expenditure relative to GDP increased again afterwards and is slightly higher 
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today than in 1975 (see figure 1), for most of the key programmes, including the old age 
pension, benefit levels have declined relative to average wages and eligibility has been 
tightened. In pensions, retrenchment started in 1986 under Labour and, although the 
conservative National government first accelerated this process, the universal pension 
was finally restored by a centre-right coalition. In family policy, the shift towards 
needs-based assistance already started in the 1970s and continues until today, regardless 
of the parties in office. Partisan differences on the issue of work testing and activation 
appear rather marginal. Given this record, it would be rather misleading to speak of a 
clear partisan divide on welfare retrenchment. 
In terms of its structural characteristics, the welfare state seems quite resilient in the 
long run. Pensions and health care are still essentially universal schemes, and – with the 
longstanding but minor exception of accident compensation – social insurance-based 
policies are non-existent. Means testing is now even more important than in 1975. 
Family policy is the only field that has seen an outright shift in principle from universal 
benefits towards means tested assistance. On the whole – and despite the end of the 
‘wage earners’ welfare state’ – income maintenance is still a mix of citizenship-based 
and needs-based programmes but with a noticeable tilt towards the latter.  
Switzerland 
Switzerland prior to the 1970s has generally been assigned to the liberal world of 
welfare. Only old age and disability insurance were mandatory for the whole 
population, and accident insurance for certain groups. Private providers played an 
important role, especially in health care. Additionally, Switzerland only spent a 
comparatively low share of GDP on social provision. It also was a laggard with regard 
to the date when the core programmes of the welfare state were finally introduced.  
The impressive increase in social expenditure in Switzerland since the 1970s (see 
figure 1) raises the question whether the Swiss welfare state has experienced 
fundamental change over the last three decades.  
The Swiss political system is characterised by a strong fragmentation of power and a 
large number of actors involved in decision-making, rendering lopsided measures 
unlikely. Federalism is strong, with the main channels of cantonal influence on the 
federal level being the upper chamber of parliament, the constitutional right to be heard 
in the pre-parliamentary consultation process and the fact that constitutional change 
demands the majority of popular votes in a majority of cantons as well as a majority of 
votes in the whole country. Trade unions and business organisations also have the right 
to be heard in the pre-parliamentary decision-making process. The Swiss federal 
government is a collegial body where all major parties are represented with a share 
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unchanged14 since 1959. Several instruments of direct democracy enable citizens to 
overrule any major decision on the federal level: a referendum is compulsory for all 
amendments to the constitution; through the optional referendum, the people can 
challenge parliamentary bills or decrees; and with the people’s initiative, citizens may 
seek a decision on an amendment to the constitution.   
The Swiss pension scheme rests on a ‘three pillar model’ which became officially 
recognised in 1982. The first pillar is a state-run, mandatory old age and survivors’ 
insurance (AHV), covering the entire resident population and providing minimal 
financial security for retirement. It is mainly financed on a pay-as-you-go basis through 
parity contributions of employers and employees and state-subsidies. Since 1965, means 
tested supplementary benefits exist to support needy recipients. The second pillar 
consists of fully-funded occupational pensions. It is compulsory for employees above a 
certain income level and is to guarantee the previous standard of living when combined 
with AHV. The third pillar is made up of voluntary savings supported by tax relief and 
has remained largely unchanged during the period under review. 
Most changes have occurred in the first pillar. It was mainly the pressures imposed 
by the economic crisis of the 1970s and growing financial troubles of the AHV 
compensation fund which caused two reforms. These reforms share several features: 
They combined cuts with expansion of benefits, and they were challenged by optional 
referenda or people’s initiatives. However, these reforms were only incremental with 
the basic programme principles remaining unchanged (Armingeon 2001: 158). The 
most important modification took place in the 1990s and combined major improvements 
for women (splitting of pensions for couples and granting credits for care and 
upbringing) and for low-income groups with restrictive measures (Obinger 1998: 255). 
Specifically, the retirement age for women was gradually increased, which was strongly 
contested by the left. Two tax reforms to raise revenues for AHV could not put an end 
to the financial problems of the first pillar. Therefore, another revision which was rather 
restrictive with its main focus on cost-containment was accepted by parliament in 2003. 
The reform went together with an increase of value-added tax on behalf of AHV (and 
invalidity insurance) to be decided on in a mandatory referendum because it demanded 
constitutional amendment. While the left attacked pension reform via referendum, 
bourgeois parties argued against tax increase. Both proposals were rejected by the 
voters in May 2004. This is the first time that a reform of the first pillar has failed in 
referendum.  
The second pillar has also experienced incremental change. Faced with unfavourable 
financial and stock market developments, reform seemed inevitable. In 2003, cuts such 
                                                 
14 The elections of 2003 provoked the first change of the so-called ‘magic formula’ when as a result of changed 
patterns of electoral support the Christian Democrats lost one seat to the right-wing Swiss People’s Party.   
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as the increase in retirement age for women and a reduction of the minimum conversion 
rate15 were coupled with a reduction of income limits required for mandatory insurance, 
resulting in better coverage for part-time and temporary workers. However, pure 
retrenchment took place when the federal government reduced the guaranteed interest 
rate for the first time in 2003.  
Until the 1990s, health insurance was voluntary16. The federal government 
subsidised (mostly) private sickness funds which act as carriers of health insurance, and 
regulated only minimum benefits. Health insurance is financed through non-income 
related premiums and public subsidies. While the problem of increasing health care 
costs had put the question of reform on the political agenda already in the mid-1960s, 
apart from the introduction of a strong component of co-payments in 1964, the Swiss 
system of health care had remained generally unchanged until the 1990s. Since then, 
several crucial changes have occurred. Health insurance became mandatory for the 
entire resident population in 1994. Although nearly the whole population had been 
covered before, this was a system-shift which entails an enlarged role for the federal 
state in social policy. The reform was marked by a tendency to combine expansive with 
restrictive measures. While competition between providers was strongly enhanced, the 
reform again increased co-payments. The scope of benefits in-kind covered by health 
insurance was somewhat enlarged and explicit discrimination of women was eliminated 
with the abolition of gender-related premiums. Similar to New Zealand, state subsidies 
were targeted to low-income groups and additionally, cantons were empowered to 
policy implementation. Risk compensation between funds was introduced and in order 
to contain costs, new forms of insurance like Health Maintenance Organisations 
(HMOs) were set up.  
Because cost-containment achieved by the reform of 1994 was not considered 
sufficient, further modification of health insurance was on the political agenda. In 2003, 
the lower chamber of parliament dismissed a minor revision mainly focusing on 
hospital financing, while the federal government imposed strongly contested 
retrenchment: Mandatory co-payments were again enhanced and maximum deductions 
for optional co-payments were reduced. However, the federal government has drafted 
several more encompassing reform ‘packages’ in 2004.  
Federal family policy is the stepchild of social policy in Switzerland. Its development 
is marked by both sovereign and parliament preventing an enlargement of federal 
involvment (Herzig 1995: 181). This especially applies to social protection in case of 
motherhood and harmonising regulations in the field of family allowances17. Here, apart 
                                                 
15 The minimum conversion rate is used to convert individual savings in the second pillar into annual pensions.  
16 Cantons were allowed to declare it mandatory for sections or the whole cantonal population and also to levy 
employer’s premiums.  
17 Until today, three attempts to create a federal maternity insurance have failed in optional referenda, the last one in 
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from federal benefits for small farmers and agricultural employees, various cantonal 
allowances exist which differ in type, level and conditions for entitlement.  
Since maternity insurance was lacking at the federal level, the canton of Genève 
created a cantonal insurance in 2000, with other cantons intending to follow. This 
illustrates how Swiss federalism makes it possible for individual cantons to step in when 
the decision-making process is blocked on the federal level (Moser 2003). While a tax 
reform which, amongst other things, aimed at lowering the tax burden of families failed 
in a referendum in 2004, the people will have to decide on two family policy initiatives 
soon. A relatively modest maternity insurance proposal was attacked by a referendum 
from the right-wing Swiss People’s Party. In addition, a harmonising law on family 
allowances has been proposed by the way of a people’s initiative.   
In retrospect, the only real expansion of federal family policy since the 1970s 
occurred in 2002, when as a result of a social democratic parliamentary initiative, 
temporarily limited financial support for child-care outside the family was enacted. 
In 1975/76, only about 20 per cent of wage earners were covered by voluntary 
unemployment insurance. Voluntary insurance with federal subsidies to private, public 
and parity funds was sufficient until the 1970s because economic growth and 
spectacular low levels of unemployment acted as functional equivalents for social 
insurance. Unemployment figures could be kept low by regulating labour supply – even 
in the 1970s. In times of decreasing demand for labour, restrictive work and residency 
permit regulations were used to make foreigners leave the labour market. Additionally, 
lacking infrastructure for non-family child care discouraged women from entering the 
labour market (Wicki 2001: 251). However, the oil crisis showed that voluntary 
insurance was not able to cope with rising unemployment. Making unemployment 
insurance mandatory18 in 1976 was a system-shift which results in a stronger 
involvement of the federal state in Swiss social policy. 
The economic crisis of the 1990s hit Switzerland stronger than every cyclical slump 
since the 1930s. Unemployment figures rose dramatically19 and unemployment 
insurance ran into debts. The traditional way of regulating labour supply had become 
less effective because of the introduction of mandatory unemployment insurance, the 
increasing number of foreigners with permanent residency permits and modified 
employment patterns of women (Schmidt 1995). As a result of these pressures, reform 
                                                                                                                                               
1999. In the field of family allowances, a harmonising regulation was prevented either in parliament or in the pre-
parliamentary process. Here, especially cantonal opposition was crucial. 
18 Like in health insurance, cantons were entitled to declare it mandatory for sections or the whole cantonal 
population and to levy employer’s premiums. Since 1976, employers have to contribute to federal unemployment 
insurance.   
19 This cannot be said when compared with levels of unemployment in other European countries, but for 
Switzerland, unemployment was ‘a social problem that was virtually unknown […] before the early 1990s’ 
(Bonoli/Mach 2000: 131).  
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seemed inevitable. Since the 1990s, mandatory unemployment insurance was subject to 
several reforms, all of them inducing incremental changes which generally balanced 
cuts and expansion, while a rather restrictive reform (1997) was prevented by a 
referendum launched by the political left. Important modifications include the 
enhancement of activation in labour market policies and the buffering of gender 
discrimination. Replacements rates were reduced, but now depend on social criteria 
such as disability. Equally, targeting was strengthened as the duration of benefits was 
limited but at the same time related to the age of recipients. In the face of declining 
unemployment figures in 2002, temporary emergency measures imposed in the crisis of 
the mid-1990s (e.g. higher premiums) were ended. Finally, the qualifying period was 
doubled and the maximum number of daily allowance was further reduced.  
On the whole, all core programmes were subject to major changes since the mid-
1970s. This is especially astonishing with regard to Switzerland’s dense political 
structure, providing reform opponents with many opportunities to block changes. 
However, the great number of veto players can to a large part explain the dominant 
pattern of Swiss social policy reform since the 1970s: Especially consensus democracy 
and direct democracy paved the way for balanced reforms which distribute gains and 
losses evenly among the electorate.  
The impact of parties on social policy is problematic to disentangle in Switzerland’s 
consensus democracy since the federal government traditionally consisted of the four 
major parties. However, a clear partisan effect shows up in referenda, with the left 
generally attacking retrenchment and the bourgeois parties being successful in 
mobilising against expansive measures.  
In the long run, however, the role of the federal state in social policy was expanded 
by making unemployment and health insurance compulsory. This increase in coverage, 
programme maturation and low economic growth caused a huge increase of social 
expenditure during the period under scrutiny. Despite some benefit cuts, replacement 
rates are comparatively generous. Only family policy is characterised by few results 
when compared with legislative attempts, which is why the country remains a European 
laggard in the domain of family policy (Bonoli 1999: 73).  
Summing up, Switzerland has come closer to the conservative model of welfare 
capitalism. Nevertheless, strong liberal traits remain, for example the important role of 
co-payments and private carriers in health insurance or the substantial element of social 
control in unemployment insurance.  
4. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
In this paper we have compared social spending efforts and national reform paths in 
four open economies over the last 30 years. Despite a markedly changed international 
political economy and significant policy changes we conclude that the role of the state 
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in social provision is not on retreat. The welfare state is still a bastion of the nation state. 
Judged by spending efforts, the extent of governmental involvement in social affairs is 
greater than ever before. Moreover, there was neither a devolution of social 
responsibilities nor a profound supranational standard setting in social policy that would 
have affected the major programmes of income support run by the nation state.  
Bringing the evidence from aggregate spending patterns and the findings of our brief 
country reports together, we conclude that the ‘race to the bottom thesis’ advanced by 
neo-liberals and Marxists is rather misleading. Neither spending patterns nor structural 
changes support this scenario or a convergence towards a residual welfare state. The 
‘resilience thesis’ is much more powerful, at least regarding developments in social 
spending and welfare state funding.  
But underneath this aggregate level, social policy developments in the countries 
examined are indicative of a creeping transformation of welfare states that becomes 
apparent in the long-term analysis. This transformation has less to do with a changed 
role of the state but more with the ways and instruments of social provision as today all 
countries rely on a welfare mix that is less clear-cut than several decades ago. 
Admittedly, welfare state development is highly path dependent but incremental policy 
changes have added up to path departures in some areas of social policy.  
We do not share the view of the optimists who simply assume ‘business as usual’ 
and claim that the traditional partisan and institutional mechanisms shape contemporary 
social policy-making in the same way as it was the case during the golden age of the 
welfare state. Our findings rather suggest more subtle partisan effects. Depending on the 
specific balance of power in reforming countries, both left and right-wing governments 
started retrenchment and have adopted new views on social policy. In terms of 
institutional effects, the empirical evidence is more consistent. In the short run, formal 
political institutions have an influence on the range and speed of single reform 
measures, as exemplified by the course of social policy in New Zealand. In the long-
term, countries with a dense institutional structure (e.g. Switzerland) may be equally 
capable of achieving extensive policy changes. 
The broad developmental trajectories of social policy identified in this paper can be 
described as a dual convergence of welfare states. On the one hand, social spending 
levels have not only increased in almost all countries but also converged, mainly 
because of the catch-up of former welfare state laggards. First and foremost, this 
process is driven by belated programme maturation in these countries. On the other 
hand, welfare states have also structurally converged in the sense that the regulatory 
patterns in which states provide benefits are less distinctive compared to the golden age. 
Hence, welfare states have become more similar as they have lost some of their salient 
structural characteristics that underpinned Esping-Andersen’s regime typology (Esping-
Andersen 1990) resulting in a ‘blurring of regimes’ (Goodin and Rein 2001: 771). The 
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nations examined have also pursued common policy routes: Activation and workfare in 
labour market policy, enhanced co-payments in health insurance as well as a shift of 
emphasis to family policy are cases in point. Both activation and co-payments can be 
regarded as a reallocation of responsibilities from the state to the individual. However, it 
would be wrong to conclude that the state’s overall role in welfare provision has 
declined. In all four countries the state has become more active in family policy, both 
via increased income support to families and extended social services. These common 
policy routes contribute to the blurring of regimes which is taking place underneath the 
surface of welfare state resilience. However, the exact causes underpinning this 
creeping transformation of welfare states and its implications for the welfare state will 
be explored in more detail in future research. 
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